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1.

Introduction
In the wake of high profile business collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH

Insurance, and OneTel, and the increase in shareholder activism, public attention has
become more focussed on corporate governance (Petra, 2005; Peaker, 2003; Roberts
et al., 2005). A common feature of these corporate scandals has been an inadequate
system of corporate governance (O’Regan et al., 2005). Defined as the “system by
which companies are directed and controlled” (ASX, 2003, p. 3; Long et al., 2005, p.
667), corporate governance is concerned with the “duties and responsibilities of a
company’s board of directors in managing the company” (Pass, 2004, p. 52).
Conflicts of interest between company directors and executives have prompted
both legislative and non-legislative reform aimed at safeguarding the interests of
corporate stakeholders and strengthening the independence of company boards
through the appointment of non-executive directors. Described as the “mainstay of
good governance” (Editorial, 2003, p. 287), non-executive directors are considered to
be a guarantee of the integrity and accountability of company boards. Although
efforts to define the role of a non-executive director are said to have “taxed the
nation’s finest intellects” (Ham, 2002), non-executive directors typically participate in
long-term decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify potential
business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company executives (Pass, 2004;
Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003).
Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board
composition in Australia and elsewhere has sought to establish causal relationships
between board structure and firm performance or sought to apply a theoretical
explanation for the behaviour of corporate boards. Kiel and Nicholson (2003), for
example, examined the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX),
describing the board composition, examining the correlates of board composition, and
2

attempting to link board demographics with corporate performance. Sharma (2004)
studied the relationship between board independence and fraud across a sample of 62
Australian listed companies. He found that the presence of independent directors on
company boards, and the absence of duality (board of director chairman not also
being the CEO) significantly reduced the likelihood of fraud (Sharma, 2004). In the
Malaysian context, Abdullah (2006) used regression analysis to predict, inter alia, the
relationship between board independence and financial distress using a sample of
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia, finding no statistically significant
relationships between these variables.
Long et al. (2005) compared the role of non-executive directors between listed
and unlisted UK companies. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews which
covered issues relating to strategy involvement, financial monitoring, and overall
board contribution, they found that non-executive directors on listed boards are
inhibited by high levels of visibility, shareholder perception, information asymmetry,
and the impact of corporate governance regulation (Long et al., 2005). Brennan and
McDermott (2004) assessed the extent of independence of boards of companies listed
on the Irish stock exchange, profiling 80 company’s boards and their adherence to the
independence requirements set out in the Higgs Report.
Interestingly,

Hooghiemstra

and

van

Manen

(2004)

proposed

“independence paradox” concerning the role of non-executive directors.

an

They

conducted telephone interviews and mail questionnaires to survey the opinions of
Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations. They found that,
although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from
management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same
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group to provide them with the information necessary for decision making, thus
leading to an independence paradox (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004, p. 322).
In an examination of the characteristics of non-executive directors in the UK,
Pass (2004) conducted an empirical study of 50 listed companies. Gathering data on
non-executive directors’ characteristics such as age, gender, length of service,
remuneration, and other directorships, Pass’s (2004) study presented a comprehensive
profile of non-executive directors within large UK companies and considered the
consistency of this profile with the requirements and recommendations contained in
legislative reforms. The value of studies such as that conducted by Pass (2004) was
noted by Pettigrew (1992, p. 178) who argued that:
…the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by overambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition
to outcome variables such as board and firm performance. The task perhaps
is a simpler one, to…provide some basic descriptive findings about boards
and their directors.

Following the lead of Pass’s (2004) study, and keeping in mind the comments of
Pettigrew (1992), this research provides a descriptive profile of the non-executive
directors of Australia’s largest public companies. In the next section, the Australian
corporate governance framework is reviewed. This is followed by details of the
sample of companies examined and a description of the characteristics of the nonexecutive directors of these companies. Finally conclusions are presented, along with
research limitations and suggestions for future research.

2.

Background: Corporate governance in Australia
Corporate governance policy reform in Australia has primarily been a

response to both local and international corporate collapses, which were largely due to
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fraudulent behaviour and practices of key executives and inadequate corporate
governance systems. Even though the Australian corporate failures “lacked the global
impact of American failures like Enron and WorldCom” (Robins, 2006, p. 34),
Australian organisations such as HIH Insurance, and OneTel brought home the reality
of the larger, and more publicised, collapses of US organisations. The US response
was principally legislative, for example the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In Australia
the response has been a mix of legislative and non-legislative initiatives which have
included the development of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act, known as “CLERP 9”, the adoption of the
International Financial Reporting Standards, and the establishment of a Corporate
Governance Council by the ASX (Robins, 2006).
Work began on CLERP 9 in September 2002, with one of the key aims being
to restore public confidence in corporate Australia by strengthening the disclosure,
financial reporting, and governance framework within which Australian businesses
operate. Also at this time, the HIH Royal Commission, led by Justice Neville Owen,
was underway to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the failure of the HIH
Insurance Group.

The Royal Commission has had an important influence on

corporate governance in Australia with many definitions, models, and principles
considered by Justice Owen during his investigation. In sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the
HIH Final Report, Justice Owen noted the importance of corporate governance
structures that would not prejudice the interests of creditors, employees, and
shareholders, and that would ensure that these stakeholders have confidence in the
management of the business (HIH Final Report, 2003). The background, skills, and
expertise of board members were considered relevant to the development of good
corporate governance practices and Justice Owen stressed the importance of the
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presence of independent non-executive directors on company boards (HIH Final
Report, 2003).
Just prior to the handing down of Justice Owen’s HIH Final Report in April
2003, the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council released its ten Principles of Good
Corporate Governance in March (see Figure 1). These ten principles, and associated
recommendations and guidelines, were intended to optimise “corporate performance
and accountability in the interests of shareholders and the broader community” (ASX,
2003, p. 5).1 Recognising that not all companies have the same reporting and
disclosure requirements, and, consistent with the recommendations of Justice Owen
(HIH Final Report, 2003), the ASX Principles were not made compulsory, however if
a listed entity elected not to follow the recommendations, justification must be
provided.
Take in Figure 1

As shown in Figure 1, the second principle refers to the structure of the board
of directors. It is recommended that boards of listed organisations have a majority of
non executive independent directors so that the board is able to appropriately
discharge its responsibilities and duties.

The purpose of non-executive director

independence, both actual and perceived, is to provide key stakeholders such as
shareholders and regulators with confidence that the director is sufficiently removed
from the management of the organisation and “free of any business or other
relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their unfettered and
independent judgement” (ASX, 2003, p. 19). Reiter and Rosenberg (2003, p. 1)
supported this argument by explaining that the true independent director is one who is
“unconstrained by potential conflicts of interest will bring the sort of rigour and

1

The ASX Corporate Governance Principles have been updated and were to be effective from 1 July
2007, however the date for their adoption has been postponed until 1 January 2008 (ASX, 2007).
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critical analysis required to limit recurrences of the debacles we have seen, and restore
investor confidence”.
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggested that an effective board is composed of
directors who are independent and competent and behave in manner that supports
these characteristics. Competence has been measured by reference to such factors as
years of experience, qualifications, and breadth of experience (O’Higgins, 2002; Pass,
2004). However ascertaining whether or not a director is truly independent is more
subjective and it may be difficult to determine the level of independence of particular
directors (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).

The ASX recommendations enable a non-

executive director to be classified as independent provided he or she is not a
substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed by the company in an
executive capacity during the last three years, has not been a material professional
advisor of the company during the last three years, has no material contractual
relationship with the company (ASX, 2003).2 However, while a director may meet
the ASX definition of an independent director, social relationships, friendships and
other forms of conflicts can compromise independence (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).
Young (2003, p. 2) defines this ASX-type definition of independence as “resume
independence”.
To examine the profile of non-executive directors serving on the boards of
Australian listed companies, a sample was selected from the ASX 50 listing. Details
of the sample and the data gathered are provided in the following section.

2

The ASX Principles (2003) state that an independent director is a non-executive director if he or she
is not a member of management. The data for this research were collected on the basis of this
definition, hence (if not made explicit in the annual report) where an independent director was not part
of the management team, they were considered a non-executive director, and where non-executive
directors were considered to be independent from management.
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3.

Empirical tests

3.1 Sample selection
A sample of 42 companies was selected from the ASX 50, which comprises
the 50 largest stocks by market capitalisation in Australia (ASX, 2006). A list of the
companies selected for the analysis is presented in Appendix 1. Eight companies
were eliminated from the sample because information concerning the non-executive
directors was absent or the company structure was not typical of a reporting entity.
For example, Macquarie Airports which consists of three entities, a company
incorporated in Bermuda, and two trust vehicles (Macquarie Airports, 2006). The 42
companies that comprised the sample group for this study were drawn from 9 industry
sectors, as summarised in Table 1.
Take in Table 1

The 2006 annual report for each company of the sample was obtained and,
consistent with Pass (2004), the following information gathered:
•

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total board of directors

•

Age of each of the non-executive directors, where available

•

Gender of each of the non-executive directors

•

Average time served by the non-executive directors on the company board

•

Remuneration of each non-executive director

•

Number of other non-executive directorships held

The results from this analysis are presented in the following section.
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4.

Results

4.1

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total
As noted, 42 companies were selected for the analysis. Across that sample

there were 288 non-executive directors from a total of 354 board members.
Therefore, in total, 81 percent of company board members were independent nonexecutive directors. The ASX requirement that the majority of board members be
independent from management was met by all companies sampled. The companies
with the lowest percentage of non-executive directors were Macquarie Bank (64
percent) and Westfield (62 percent), however these boards still maintained a majority
of non-executive directors.
In comparison with the UK, it appears that Australian boards contain
proportionally more non-executive directors. The majority of companies studied by
Pass (2004) had non-executive directors comprising between 50 and 60 percent of the
total board. It is also interesting to note the results of Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003)
examination of Australian corporate boards in 1996. Although their research involved
a sample of 348 companies and is therefore not comparable to the current study, Kiel
and Nicholson (2003) reported that the average proportion of non-executive directors
on Australian company boards in 1996 was 69 percent.

4.2 Age and gender of non-executive directors
The average age of non-executive directors on Australian company boards
ranged from 32 to 74, with the average age being 60 years. This result is consistent
with Pass (2004) who reported the average age of non-executive directors on the
boards of the 50 largest UK companies to be 59 years. Interestingly, the average age
of male non-executive directors (61 years) was significantly higher than that of female
non-executive directors (53 years).
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There were significantly fewer female non-executive directors compared to
males, with just 17 percent of company boards including one or more female nonexecutive directors. This compares to Pass’ (2004) study which showed women
represented 11 percent of the total number of non-executive directors examined. Both
these and Pass’s (2004) results appear to be an improvement on the situation
described by Li and Wearing (2004), who reported that only 6 percent of nonexecutive directors in the top 350 UK listed companies were female and suggested
that women face a “second glass ceiling” even after reaching board level (Li &
Wearing, 2004, p. 355). Indeed, there were only two female Chairmen serving on
Australian company boards during 2006.

4.3 Time served by non-executive directors
According to ASX Principle 2, to be considered independent from
management, a director must “not have served on the board for a period which could
or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the director’s ability to
act in the best interests of the company” (ASX, 2003, p. 20). Therefore, it was
important to collect data on the length of time served by non-executive directors on
company boards. As shown in Table 2, the length of service ranged from less than
one year to 23 years, with the average time served by non-executive directors on a
particular company board being 6 years.
Take in Table 2

This result is consistent with Pass (2004) who found that the average length of
service by non-executive directors was 5.6 years. However, the substantial length of
time served by some non-executive directors, particularly those spending 10 or more
years with the same company, could reasonably be perceived to interfere with the
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independence of these board members from the company and thus conflict with ASX
Principle 2.

4.4 Remuneration of non-executive directors
The ASX Principles provide that non-executive directors may receive
remuneration but that it must be disclosed clearly and adequately distinguished from
the remuneration applied to company executives. In almost all cases this Principle
was adhered to by the companies sampled.

However, it was the independence

principle that became questionable upon reviewing the salary packages of nonexecutive directors. The average remuneration of non-executive director chairman of
company boards in 2006 was $456,946, while the average salary of all other nonexecutive directors in that year was $149,662. While this remuneration pales in
comparison to the salaries and share options packages received by executives of these
major companies, it would be difficult to justify, particularly to a layman, the
independence of non-executive directors from a company that is paying them salary in
excess of $149,000.

4.5 Other non-executive directorships
There has been global concern over the incidence of multiple directorships
(Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006). Although there may be some benefits of
multiple directorships, such as bringing to company boards access to key resources,
the Australian Shareholders Association has argued that any director who serves of
more than five boards is not acting in the best interests of company shareholders (Kiel
& Nicholson, 2006). The non-executive directors examined in this sample held an
average of three other directorships, with the largest number of other directorships
held being nine (see Table 3).
Take in Table 3
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Many of these multiple directorships are held with other companies within the
ASX 50. For example, Ms Elizabeth Alexander serves on the boards of Boral Ltd and
CSL Ltd, and Dr Nora Scheinkestel serves on the boards of AMP Ltd, Orica Ltd and
Newcrest Mining Ltd.

Mr David Gonski, a non-executive director of Westfield

Holdings Ltd, is also the Chairman of Coca-Cola Amatil and a director of ANZ Ltd,
while Mr Don Argus serves on the boards of BHP Billiton Ltd and Brambles
Industries Ltd.

These overlapping relationships of directors across companies,

referred to as interlocking directorships in the literature, enable board’s to remain
strategically aware of other company’s actions and may facilitate the development of
strong lobbying positions among major corporations (Murray, 2001).

5.

Summary and conclusion
This study has indicated that Australia’s largest companies are adopting ASX

Principles of Good Corporate Governance.

One of the key issues in Australian

corporate governance reform has been the appointment of non-executive directors to
company boards (ASX, 2003; Robins, 2006). In this analysis of 42 companies, of the
354 board members reviewed, 81 percent were non-executive directors. However,
despite the appointment of non-executive directors to corporate boards, concerns as to
the actual and perceived independence of these directors persist.

While actual

independence may be difficult to ascertain without being privy to the nuances of
boardroom friendships, social relationships, and other forms of potential conflict, the
perception of independence may be significantly compromised by the levels of
remuneration received by non-executive directors. In the companies’ sampled, the
average level of remuneration of non-executive chairmen was $456,946 and, for nonexecutive directors, average remuneration was in excess of $149,000. It would be
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difficult to explain to key stakeholders at an annual general meeting that a nonexecutive director of a company can act independently while at the same time
receiving such substantial compensation. The ASX Principles address this issue by
simply stating that the level of remuneration must be “sufficient and reasonable”
(ASX, 2003, p. 51). The subjectivity of these terms inhibits their usefulness as a
source of valuable guidance. A related issue was identified by Hooghiemstra and van
Manen (2004) as the independence paradox which arises due to non-executive
directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, relying heavily on the
information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be
independent.
The primary limitation of this study is the size bias resulting from the review
of Australia’s largest companies. The research could be extended to include a random
sample of companies outside the top 50 and the examination could be conducted over
a period of time to obtain a broader perspective of corporate governance practices in
Australia. Future research could also incorporate theoretical perspectives such as
network theory used by Murray (2001) to explain interlocking directorships across
company boards.
It is argued that the presence of competent non-executive directors on the
boards of companies is a significant benefit to the majority of stakeholders of
organisations, particularly shareholders and regulators (Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson,
2003). Non-executive directors can contribute significantly to organisations through
setting organisational strategy, monitoring the performance of and reporting from
executive management, and contributing to the development or removal of executive
management. However, is the benefit to key stakeholders the result of directors’
independence, their competence or a mixture of both?

The lack of prescriptive
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legislation in Australia, the fact that the current ASX guidelines are based on a
“comply or explain” philosophy (Higgs, 2003), and the absence of specific guidance
on the role of non-executive directors in the ASX guidelines means that concern over
the independence of non-executive directors is likely to continue.
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Appendix 1: Companies selected for analysis from the ASX 50
Symbol Company
Sector
AWC
Alumina Limited
Materials
AMC
Amcor Limited
Materials
AMP
AMP Limited
Financials
ALL
Aristocrat Leisure Limited
Consumer Discretionary
ANZ
Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Limited
Financials
AGL
Australian Gas Light Company (The)
Utilities
BHP
BHP Billiton Limited
Materials
BSL
Bluescope Steel Limited
Materials
BLD
Boral Limited
Materials
BIL
Brambles Industries Limited
Industrials
CCL
Coca-Cola Amatil Limited
Consumer Staples
CML
Coles Myer Limited
Consumer Staples
CBA
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia
Financials
CSL
CSL Limited
Health Care
FXJ
Fairfax (John) Holdings Limited
Consumer Discretionary
FGL
Foster's Group Limited
Consumer Staples
IAG
Insurance Australia Group Limited
Financials
JHX
James Hardie Industries N.V.
Materials
LLC
Lend Lease Corporation Limited
Financials
MBL
Macquarie Bank Limited
Financials
NAB
National Australia Bank Limited
Financials
NCM
Newcrest Mining Limited
Materials
ORI
Orica Limited
Materials
ORG
Origin Energy Limited
Energy
PMN
Promina Group Limited
Financials
QAN
Qantas Airways Limited
Industrials
QBE
Qbe Insurance Group Limited
Financials
RIN
Rinker Group Limited
Materials
RIO
Rio Tinto Limited
Materials
STO
Santos Limited
Energy
SGB
St George Bank Limited
Financials
SGP
Stockland
Financials
SUN
Suncorp-Metway Limited.
Financials
TAH
Tabcorp Holdings Limited
Consumer Discretionary
TLS
Telstra Corporation Limited.
Telecommunications Services
TCL
Transurban Group
Industrials
WES
Wesfarmers Limited
Industrials
WDC
Westfield Group
Financials
WBC
Westpac Banking Corporation
Financials
WPL
Woodside Petroleum Limited
Energy
WOW
Woolworths Limited
Consumer Staples
Source: Standard & Poor's - Indicies S&P/ASX 50 (available at:
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/au/page.topic/indices_asx50/)
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Figures and tables

Figure 1: ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance
A company should:
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight
Recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities of board and management.
2. Structure the board to add value
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its
responsibilities and duties.
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making
Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making.
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting
Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial
reporting.
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure
Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company.
6. Respect the rights of shareholders
Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights.
7. Recognise and manage risk
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control.
8. Encourage enhanced performance
Fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness.
9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly
Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.
10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders
Recognise legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Source: ASX, 2006
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Table 2: Time served by non-executive directors
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